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Importance of information security is rapidly increasing when new security breaches are 
continuously reported by companies and organizations. These breaches cause loss of 
confidentiality, reputation and revenue for companies and organizations. They can also 
get legal penalties due lack of information security. To improve information security, 
companies and organizations are required to conduct assessment and audits for their 
systems to make sure that they do not have open critical vulnerabilities. In addition, 
information security risks need to be evaluated as part of companies’ and organizations’ 
risk management to prepare against possible attackers. 
Multiple different information security risk assessment frameworks have been developed 
to help companies and organizations to conduct information security risk assessment. To 
find out which framework is suitable for their needs, management needs to compare the 
different frameworks, estimate how much time and how many people are available for 
the assessment and how the frameworks have worked previously in the context. In this 
thesis, suitability of genre-based security risk assessment framework GBM-OA is 
evaluated in context of centralized CI/CD environment. 
A canonical action research was conducted in a team providing centralized CI/CD 
solution for the company’s projects. In the study, information security risk assessment 
was conducted using GBM-OA, and after the assessment semi-structured interviews were 
conducted for the participants to find out if the framework was suitable in the context. 
The findings show that the framework provided sufficient results for the team without 
taking much time from the participants. Additionally, participants found value in 
definition of environment, which helps the team to understand how responsibilities are 
split to different stakeholders. Downsides were confusing terminology used in the 
framework and filling of the templates was found compelling. About suitability, it was 
found that the framework is not suitable in the context as it is. Participants did not like 
that the assessment should be done separately, but it should be integrated into automation 
or development cycle. Right now, there is not any instructions regarding integration or 
iteration, even though it is stated that it is possible. Participants also provided 
improvement suggestions to add step to the framework for risk impact definition. 
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1. Introduction 
When computers were just coming to the market, companies conducted business without 
having to rely on information systems. When time passed and new technological 
discoveries were made, companies and organisations started to use different systems in 
business-critical areas, giving them competitive advance against competitors. While 
computing power increased, also did the possibility of security attacks also increased. 
Hence making information security a major topic for information systems. This 
development raised the discussion about information security risk management, which 
consists of risk assessment, development of countermeasures or mitigation activities and 
monitoring of risks status. This process allows proactive protection of business-critical 
assets while also saving resources from protection of invaluable assets or wasting 
resources in mitigation of small or insignificant risks (Shedden et al., 2011). 
When internet became widely used and computers were bought by individual consumers, 
information security was not a big topic and it did not get much attention. When attacks 
started to occur against companies, vulnerabilities were just fixed, and the risks were not 
identified or managed. If company identified a threat, a technical solution was 
implemented to counter it. At the end of 20th century, researchers realized that information 
security is not a topic that can be handled using technical solutions alone. As a result of 
this conclusion, economical point of view started to be a major part of information 
security risk management. This development allowed managers to see security as an 
investment, because consequences of security attacks were analysed as economical losses 
(Acquisti et al., 2006). 
Organizations’ assets are in constant radar of possible attackers which can be seen as 
multiple different types to threats against the assets. These threats contain risks that can 
be identified using risk management. To reduce risks and to ensure that assets and 
organization’s confidential information are kept secret, organizations often rely on 
technology-based solutions. Even though technological solutions are important 
component in information security, using only those solution is not enough to cover all 
risks. Bulgurcu et. al. (2010.) argue that even though organizations invest heavily in 
technological solutions to protect their assets, number of breaches is still increasing. They 
also argue that to cover all risks, both technological solutions and socio-organizational 
approaches should be implemented. 
In this thesis I talk about information security risk assessment, which is part of risk 
management. Risk management consists of three parts: (1) risk identification, 
measurement and assessment, (2) risk evaluation and mitigation, and (3) risk control and 
monitoring (Xie et al., 2011.). I want to find out what frameworks there are available to 
conduct risk assessment, how to implement risk assessment framework in practise and 
how well the selected assessment framework works in the implemented context. 
To find out how to implement risk assessment framework in practice and how well the 
selected framework suits to the context, canonical action research was conducted in a 
company. In evaluation of the framework, qualitative semi-structured interviews were 




The structure of this thesis is as follows. First, I will discuss about prior research 
conducted regarding risk assessment frameworks and I want to find out what kind of 
options there is for risk assessment. This discussion can be found from section 2. Second, 
I will introduce the context and method used to implement risk assessment framework in 
practice. This can be found from section 3. Third, I will describe how the implementation 
was done and what were the outcomes of the implementation. This can be found from 
section 3.4. Lastly, I will conclude what was done in this thesis and what were the most 
important findings and learnings. I will also discuss about limitations of this research and 
what could be the possibilities for future research. 
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2. Prior research 
In this section I will introduce prior research conducted about risk assessment. I will also 
introduce few frameworks that are developed to conduct structured risk assessment. The 
objective of this section is to introduce different studies conducted about risk assessment 
and what different approaches to conduct risk assessment there are available. 
2.1 Risks, threats, and vulnerabilities in information security 
Risk is usually defined as a combination of the probability of occurrence and its 
consequence. In information security, risk can be defined as a possibility that a threat will 
take advantage of vulnerability of an asset or multiple assets, and thereby causing harm 
to the target of the attack. Risk consists of threat or threats which affect one or more asset, 
which would have a negative effect to the asset or assets. An example of information 
security risk would be a hacker exploiting social engineering (threat) to an employee of a 
company, who does not have much understanding about information security 
(vulnerability), leading to unauthorized access to company resources (assets) which 
would cause loss of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information (consequence). 
Identification of these risks, development of countermeasures against these risks and 
monitoring these risks state is called risk management (Gordon and Loeb, 2005). 
2.2 Information security risk assessment 
Information is an important asset for companies, and it should be protected as much as 
possible. The importance of information varies by the size of the company and the role 
that the information plays in the company’s business model. Since information is so 
critical to companies, it is significant target for attacks. Shameli-Sendi et. al. (2016) argue 
that cyber threats are the leading business threat right after economic uncertainties. To 
protect the information within the company, managers aim to improve their security. 
Information security has been improved using security tools and training the staff to 
spread awareness of staff responsibility in protection of information (Baker et. al., 2007). 
To identify security risks within organization, effective risk management process is 
required. Predefined process will make it easy to conduct risk management and make 
successful protection of information possible. Risk management process contains 
identification of risks, assessment of risks and taking steps to lower possibility of the risk 
to acceptable level (Stoneburner et. al., 2002). From these steps, assessment of risks is 
the most important part (Peltier, 2005). The goal of risk assessment is to link risks and 
assets affected by the risk together and prioritize them. Careful risk assessment protects 
the organization and enables organization to take actions against the threats. Risk 
assessment also helps organizations to implement preventive controls and safeguards 





Key components in information security risk assessment are assets to be protected, threats 
against the assets and vulnerabilities that expose assets. Assets are something of value for 
organization. Mostly these assets can be defined as information. Assets are identified 
within the scope of the assessment and their value and criticality are evaluated. Threat is 
something that might cause harm for the organization. Usually this threat is a person, but 
abstract concepts, such as nature, should be taken into consideration. Vulnerabilities are 
holes in the security system which allow unauthorized access to the assets (Wangen et. 
al., 2018). 
Multiple different information security risk assessment processes are developed, but 
usually they contain three steps: context establishment, risk identification and risk 
analysis (Dhillon, 2007; Shedden et. al, 2006). The goals of these steps are to define the 
organizational context for the risks, identify the most important assets to be protected to 
allow prioritization of the risks, identify the threats and vulnerabilities affecting the assets 
and calculate the probability of occurrence and impact of the threat if it occurs (Whitman 
& Mattord, 2005). The information provided by these steps can be used to define risk 
management plans and management is able to justify the costs generated by risk 
management. 
Whatever risk management approach is chosen by a company or organisation, it always 
contains the assessment of business-critical assets of possible threats, vulnerabilities, and 
measures that can reduce the risk to acceptable level (Baskerville, 1993). While deep 
understanding about the organisation in discussion and the information security field as a 
whole is important to most of the risk management methods, there has not been much 
research about formal knowledge representation of the areas that are relevant to 
information security risk management (Herzog et. al., 2007). Research has shown that in 
most of the cases where the selected risk management method has not worked well for 
the company was caused by management missing understanding of information security 
(Straub & Welke, 1998). 
2.3 Challenges in information security risk management 
Fenz et. al. (2014.) presented six challenges regarding information security risk 
management: (1) asset and countermeasure inventory, (2) assigning asset values, (3) 
failed predictions of risks, (4) the overconfidence effect, (5) knowledge sharing and (6) 
risk vs. cost trade-offs. Challenge 1 presents a concern that since individual fragments of 
information are connected to each other, the inventory of assets grows large. Hence, the 
environment gets complex when company or organization is growing. To enable 
sufficient risk identification, assets need to be categorized to inventory, so they can be 
analysed during risk assessment. Challenge 2 shows that it is hard to evaluate assets that 
are small, or which do not have straight monetary value. To tackle this issue the values 
should not be set to money, but to some other measure which indicates how much one 
asset is worth. This measurement should be defined by the company or organization based 
of the assets value in business process. Challenge 3 shows that prediction of attackers’ 
interests might not be accurate, since interests tend to shift due time. In addition, 
definition of risks might be hard since the weight of assets change due time and the 
outcomes of risk realization might be unknown. Challenge 4 shows that managers tend to 
be overconfident about their assets, hence not all risks can be identified, or they do not 
get enough attention. To prevent this issue from realizing, risk management processes 
need to be improved to remove the overconfidence. Challenge 5 emphasizes the need of 
knowledge sharing among experts. Knowledge sharing reduces the cost of knowledge 
acquisition during risk management and improves the product quality. If knowledge is 
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not shared enough, the cost of risk assessment grows. Challenge 6 means that costs of 
countermeasures and mitigation activities should not exceed the loss of resources if a risk 
realizes. It is hard to estimate the costs if risk realizes but at the same time the cost of 
countermeasures should not be more than the estimated cost of risk realization. 
2.4 DevOps and DevSecOps 
In the research context I will be discussing about DevOps. It is a practice which enables 
flexibility and effectiveness for software teams. The core concept is about combining 
software development and operations. To achieve this, there are multiple instruction 
about how processes should be implemented, for example automation of building, testing 
and deployment of software, collaboration between development and operations teams 
and active knowledge sharing (Ebert et. al., 2016). Benefits of adopting DevOps practices 
into software teams are faster feature development and release time, more commits to 
codebase in daily basis, improved quality assurance and enhanced collaboration and 
communication. There are also drawbacks in adaption of DevOps. Since the practise 
requires active communication between teams, lack of communication blocks the whole 
adaption. To get the benefits of DevOps, a change in mindset is required from whole 
organization so the management can understand how the practise brings value for the 
organization. When talking about automation, there are multiple different tools that 
enable automated building, testing and deployment. Since there are multiple different 
tools available, the learning stack for the developers is very big (Riungu-Kalliosaari et. 
al., 2016). 
 






When talking about information security, DevOps itself does not take information 
security into account. To integrate security aspects to DevOps practises, a new practise 
has been developed called DevSecOps. It is defined as expansion to DevOps, where 
security controls and processes are integrated into DevOps development cycle, and it can 
be achieved with collaboration between security teams, development teams and operation 
teams (Myrbakken & Colomo-Palacios, 2017). DevSecOps consists of 13 characteristics 
which will help companies with implementing information security while following 
DevOps practices. These characteristics are collaboration with team mentioned above (1), 
continuous knowledge sharing between the teams (2), security related feedback loop to 
enable quick security feedback to developers (3), continuous improvement of processes 
(4), active communication between security team and development team (5), setting clear 
responsibilities (6), establishment of trust between security team and other teams (7), 
experimenting with new ideas to improve security (8), leadership (9), ensuring 
commitment of staff (10), not to blame developers for security issues but help them fix 
them (11), hiring new personnel with security background (12) and full transparency 
inside the whole team (13) (Sánchez-Gordón & Colomo-Palacios, 2020). When these 
practices are integrated to DevOps, additional security assessments are not necessary 
since security is addressed in the DevOps practice itself. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of DevSecOps cycle (Lam & Chaillan, 2019) 
Mao et. al. (2020) present six significant factors which make it difficult to implement 
DevSecOps in practice. These factors can be separated into internal and external factors. 
Three internal factors which causes problems are (1) culture resistance, (2) high cost and 
(3) solidified organizational structure. External factors causing problems are (4) lack of 
DevSecOps experts, (5) lack of DevSecOps tools and (6) lack of mature DevSecOps 
solutions. They also argue that internal and external challenges influence each other. For 





2.5 Overview of risk assessment frameworks 
Information security risk assessment methods vary between industries, companies in the 
same industry and even inside an organization in different organization levels. Due to this 
variety, multiple different assessment frameworks have been developed (Aven, 2012). 
Even though there are multiple different assessment frameworks to use, it can be hard for 
an organization to find suitable framework to be used due to business requirements. A 
problem with many frameworks is that they follow general principles and guidelines and 
users do not get additional information regarding the implementation of preventing 
measures. The frameworks do not give enough information for managers to decide which 
implementations would be best suited for securing assets from defined risks (Sendi et. al., 
2010). 
2.5.1 CIRA 
Conflicting incentives risk analysis (CIRA) is a method, which frames risks as conflicting 
incentives between stakeholders. The method was developed by Rajbhandari and 
Snekkenes to tackle the difficulty of getting reliable likelihood estimates for risks (2013). 
Incentives in CIRA means something that motivates someone to execute an action within 
the actor’s capabilities and possibilities, which would give the actor advantage (Wangen, 
2015). These incentives can be, for example asymmetry situations of information or moral 
hazard situations. The focus in CIRA is on the stakeholders. Method evaluates their 
actions and how the outcomes of these actions affect organisations’ assets (Blakley et. al., 
2001). 
CIRA is developed based on game theory, decision, economics, and psychology. The 
strength of this method compared to other risk assessment methods lies in the threat actor 
and stakeholder assessment. Assets for the risk assessment are identified for each 
stakeholder according to utility and the method does not take business-related activities 
into account. On risk estimation, method avoids probability calculations and instead the 
risk is estimated by utility from executing potential strategies with accompanying 
outcomes. On risk evaluation, risk criteria are defined by the risk tolerance of the risk 
owner. This means how the risk owner can do counteractions against the risk if the risk 
occurs (Wangen et. al., 2018). 
In a study conducted by Rajbhandari and Snekkenes (2013.), a practical example of CIRA 
is provided. The process consists of 13 steps. In step one, the risk owner(s) is defined. For 
the risk owner(s), the persona is also described. In step two, the key utility factors are 
defined. These factors are something that the risk owner(s) finds valuable. In step three, 
possible strategies that might affect the factors are defined. These are the actions that 
might cause harm for the risk owner(s). in step four, roles or functions that could have a 
possibility to execute these strategies are defined. These can be some roles inside the 
organization or outside. In step five, for each role or function, a strategy owner(s) is 
defined. This is some person(s) which could have the role or could have access to the 
function. In step six, for each strategy owner(s), utility factors of interest are defined. This 
means the definition of important factors for the strategy owner(s). In step seven, the 




After these seven steps, two stakeholder categories are defined: risk owner(s) and strategy 
owner(s). In step eight, each stakeholder will give a weight to their utility factor. The idea 
here is to prioritize the factors. In step nine, each operation is evaluated against the utility 
factors and the difference is calculated. In this example, additive utility function of 
MAUT was used to estimate the affects to utilities (Dyer, 2005). In steps 10 and 11, 
estimates and calculations for the utilities if the strategy is executed against them is done. 
From these calculations it is possible to see how much the strategies effect the utility 
factors for stakeholders. In step 12, using the calculations, actual risks are determined. In 
step 13, the risks are evaluated. Here we can see the level of acceptance for a risk to the 
risk owner(s). 
 
Figure 3. CIRA assessment process. 
As seen above, the process focuses on the incentives of actors and utility factors of the 
stakeholders. The risks defined using CIRA are higher level risks and they do not give 
detailed descriptions of the risks in technical level. This makes the process time 
consuming for the organization, since all the risks need to be evaluated and no technical 
specification can be used. Also, CIRA requires an expert from the field to conduct the 
risk analysis, and this can be expensive if the organization does not have one inside it. 
Although, since the risk analysis does not contain technical specification, the risks can be 
reused in other departments inside the organization. A major disadvantage of CIRA is 
that the process does not follow any regulations or IT standards, which might be a deal 
breaker for organisations’ for not choosing CIRA as risk assessment method (Agrawal, 
2017). Another advantage of not using any technical specification is that the process can 
be used to define non-technical risks. For example, Agrawal and Szekeres (2017) used 
the process to define risks for community of practise organization. 
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2.5.2 CORAS 
CORAS is a European project which is developing a framework for efficient risk 
assessment of business-critical systems. It focuses on integration of Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) in the risk management process. Unified Modelling Language is a 
modelling standard for object-oriented software design (Pooley & King, 1999). In this 
context, CORAS supports the practical use of UML in the context of security and risk 
assessment. The framework consists of four key points: A risk management process based 
on the AS/NZS 4360 standard, a risk documentation framework based on the ISO 
standard RM-ODP, an integrated risk management and development process based on 
UP and a platform for tool-inclusion based on XML (Jacobson et. al., 1999). CORAS 
covers business-critical systems in general, but places wight on information security. 
Information security includes for example achieving confidentiality and integrity of 
Business-critical systems (Stolen et. al., 2002). 
Risk assessment process in CORAS framework consists of five steps: identify context, 
identify risks, analyse risks, evaluate risks, and treat risks. Aagedal et. al. (2002.) provide 
a practical example of the risk assessment process. The first step of the process is the 
identification of context. First part of this step is to identify the area of concern. Objective 
of this part is to think about possible scenarios which would affect important assets. 
Second part is the identification and evaluation of assets. Objective of this part is to 
identify what are the assets that are relevant to the scenarios defined in the first part. Third 
part is the identification of security requirements. The objective of this part is to identify 
the security requirements to protect the assets defined in the second part. In the end of the 
first step of the assessment process the scenarios, assets and requirements have been 
defined. The second step in the risk assessment process is the identification of risks. This 
step consists of identification of threats and vulnerabilities against the assets.  
 






Third step in the risk assessment process is the analysis of defined risks. First part of the 
step is evaluation of consequences and impacts. The objective of this part is to identify 
the level of importance for consequences and impacts of risks. Second part is the 
evaluation of possibility of occurrence. Objective is to determine how likely the risk will 
realize. Fourth step of the risk assessment process is risk evaluation. This step consists of 
five parts: determination of risk level, risk prioritization, categorization of risks, 
determination of interrelationships between category themes and prioritization of 
resulting themes and risks. Last step of the risk assessment process is risk treatment. This 
consists of identification of treatment options and assessment of alternative approaches. 
Stamatiou et. al. (2003) conducted a study, where CORAS was used to conduct a risk 
assessment for telemedicine service. Their study shows that the framework improves risk 
analysis process since the understanding about the target of evaluation is improved by 
specifications of how it is structured and how it behaves. On the other hand, Fredriksen 
et. al. (2002) argue that the process depends heavily on experienced risk analysists. They 
also found out that sufficient input of documentation, including models, was critical to 
obtain valuable results. 
2.5.3 ISRAM 
Information Security Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM) is a risk assessment method 
developed by National Research Institute of Electronics and Cryptology and the Gebze 
Institute of Technology (Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005.). Since software has evolved 
from standalone applications to distributed solutions using multitasking and distributed 
processing, a risk assessment method was needed to evaluate risks in complex 
environments. The idea is to allow evaluation of complex systems by letting managers 
and staff participate together to the risk analysis. The method is a quantitative assessment 
method, which does not contain complex calculations to avoid need to use an expert to 
conduct the analysis and to save time. 
The overall process in ISRAM is based on two phase surveys. These surveys are 
independent from each other and they address the probabilities and consequences of 
defined risks (Vorster & Labuschagne, 2005). The process in detail consist seven steps: 
Identification of information security problem, listing and weighing factors that affect the 
probability of occurrence and possible consequences of the problem, conversion of the 
factors to quantitative survey questions, preparation of risk table for probabilities and 
consequences, conduction of the prepared surveys, calculation of single risk value and 
assessment of the results (Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005). 
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Figure 5. ISRAM assessment process 
In a study conducted by Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2006), researchers used modified 
ISRAM approach to evaluate ISO 17799, provides guidelines and general principles for 
initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management 
in an organization (Myler & Broadbent, 2006). The study indicates that the use of ISRAM 
is flexible since it can be easily modified to suit the situation and the modification does 
not take much time. In addition, use of software solution to conduct the surveys is 
optional, if the organization cannot use many resources for the analysis. Downside is that 
the process relies heavily to the participants. If the participants will not answer truthfully 
and accurately to the questions, the reliability of the analysis can be questioned. In 
addition, structure of the organization and the processes inside the organization can have 






2.6 Overview of risk assessment frameworks for cloud environment  
Even though the benefits of cloud computing are clear, so is the need to develop 
information security solutions for cloud computing. In addition to the challenges of 
developing secure information systems, cloud computing presents additional level of risk 
because services are usually outsourced to a third party. The externalized feature of 
outsourcing makes it hard to maintain for example data integrity and privacy, support data 
and service availability, and demonstrate compliance (Buecker et. al., 2009). Many of the 
risks associated with cloud computing are not new and can be found in organizations’ 
today. Well planned risk management activities are important to ensure that the 
information assets are at the same time available and protected from threats and cleared 
of vulnerabilities (Mather et. al., 2009). In this chapter I will present few options for 
information security risk assessment frameworks associated with cloud environments. 
2.6.1 ISGcloud 
Information Security Governance framework for cloud environment (ISGcloud) is a 
framework developed to deal with specific features of cloud computing regarding 
information security (Rebollo et. al., 2015). The framework is process oriented and it is 
based on tasks which allow development of security governance structure supporting a 
cloud computing service. During the process, the framework maintains a continuous 
security governance approach, being aligned with existing proposals such as Control 
Objectives of Information and related Technology (COBIT) (Al-Sa’eed et. al., 2012). 
The core idea behind ISGcloud is to define processes that systematize related security 
aspects, which provides organizations with an instrument for implementation, monitoring 
and management of information security (Rebollo et. al., 2015). The framework provides 
practical information to each stage of the life cycle of the cloud computing service easing 
its implementation and monitoring, allowing the integration and adaptation of standards 
(Silva et. al., 2016). 
ISGcloud consists of six activities: planning, cloud security analysis, cloud security 
design, cloud implementation, secure cloud operations and cloud service termination. A 
research conducted by Rebollo et. al. (2015.) gives practical insight how the framework 
works in practise. In the first step, a new security governance structure is defined and 
planned to be built from scratch. In step two, security analysis for the example cloud 
environment is conducted. In step three, a new security design for the security governance 
is developed. In step four, the design will be implemented to cloud environment. In step 
five, the operation of the cloud is secured. The evaluation of the framework in the same 
study showed that the framework was useful and easy to learn to most of the participants. 
20 
 
Figure 6. ISGcloud assessment process 
2.6.2 QUIRC 
Quantitative risk and impact assessment framework (QUIRC) is a risk assessment 
framework which defines risks as a combination of the probability of a threat affecting 
an asset and its severity measured as its impact. The method was introduced by Saripalli 
and Walters (2010). In their study they demonstrate how traditional security threat 
modelling can be related to the QUIRC calculations, via identification of security threat 
events. Also, Wide-band Delphi method is proposed as a suitable method for collecting 
data regarding risks affecting organizations’ assets. The Delphi method is a forecasting 
technique developed by RAND Corporation (Stuter, 1996) to collect expert opinion in an 
objective way and arrive to conclusions based on that. 
Security risks in QUIRC are linked with six key categories of security objectives (SO). 
These security objectives can be for example confidentiality, integrity, auditability, multi-
party trust, mutual auditability, and usability in a Cloud platform (Saripalli & Walters, 
2010). The framework defines an impact factor, which is the effect of a security threat 
event against organisation’s assets, and the probability of occurrence for that event to 
derive a risk value. Impact factor is drawn from one of the six security objectives and it 
is combined using a weighted sum as function of its probability. Event probability is 
defined using known statistics, such as the amount of SQL injection attack reports. Using 
the Wide-band Delphi method, experts will rank the impact of risks and the probability 








According to Djemame et. al. (2011), The advantage of QUIRC is that it enables 
comparison of information security between different cloud platform providers for 
vendors, customers, and regulation agencies, while they argue that the biggest challenge 
of this approach lies in its need for historical data for threat events probability calculation. 
A downside of QUIRC is also the fact that it does not consider specific security 
requirements as part of the factors in deriving the impact of different attacks. Security 
requirements are an important factor in security risk assessment, and hence the impact 
assessment of a threat must be based on the security requirements of the cloud tenants 
(Poolsappasit et. al., 2011). An important thing to consider in security assessment for 
cloud environment is to cover both the customization of the impact based on high-level 
business goals of a client and low-level functions of components in the network. This 
results in a specific, concrete, and accurate risk assessment. In cloud computing it has 
been known for some time that security risks differ depending on software architectural 
design patterns, thus requiring specific and clear security plans to mitigate the possibility 
of risk occurrence and the impact of the risk (Halkidis et. al., 2008). 
2.6.3 Combining NVD and CVSS 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is a popular and widely used database of 
vulnerabilities (Zhang et. al., 2011). In the database, the vulnerabilities are listed with a 
CVE-ID, which is a unique identifier for the vulnerability used to refer to it as a source. 
To this database, almost 20 new vulnerabilities are reported each day and by mid-2019, 
there were over 37000 entries of vulnerabilities (Frühwirth & Männistö, 2009). Each 
entry is public, and anyone can go look for them. Because the identifier is unique, it allows 
automation of vulnerability management and security measurement. 
In entries listed in NVD, The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is used to 
help organizations’ security managers in the prioritization of vulnerabilities by providing 
a metric for their relative severity. CVSS assigns each vulnerability a score on a scale of 
0 to 10 where higher values indicate greater severity. CVSS was originally designed as a 
framework consisting of three different metrics: the base metric, which defines the 
general features of vulnerabilities, optional temporal metric, which represents changes in 
the severity over time, and the optional environmental metric, which defines context 
information that is unique to individual user, organization, or environment (Mell et. al., 
2007). 
Lenkala et. al. (2013) propose a framework for cloud environment, where NVD is used 
as a source of vulnerabilities and the risk assessment is conducted using formulas 
developed by Joh and Malaiya (2011.). The framework defines five states for risks: not 
discovered, discovered, disclosure with patch applied, exploitation, disclosure without 
patch and disclosure with patch not applied. Transitions for each state is defined in a 
matrix and initial probability for each vulnerability is defined. Using formulas developed 
by Joh and Malaiya, confidentiality risk, integrity risk and availability risk is calculated 
using data fetched from NVD. The study conducted by Lenkala et al. shows that security 
metrics defined in their framework can differ significantly, which shows that a 
comparison framework for comparing cloud providers is needed and important. 
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2.7 Experiences from risk assessment frameworks 
Gaute Wangen (2017) conducted a study where different risk assessment frameworks 
were compared. It was found that the key criteria for selecting an assessment framework 
are content, context, experience and produced results. The study also showed that users 
of the framework prefer assessment frameworks which contain templates and examples. 
At the same time, templates produce extra paperwork, which was found a troublesome. 
Since frameworks require experience, if inexperienced risk analysist implements the 
framework, the produced outcomes may not be adequate for the context. 
Taubenberger et. al. (2011) present their experiences from traditional risk assessment 
methods. They argue that quantitative assessment methods are based on data that is not 
reliable available in practise, standards do not have guidance on possibility of occurrence 
determination, frameworks do not take design of the system into account, assessment of 
the risks are not statistically accurate and they are conducted in reliable environments, 
low and medium risks defined during the assessment process are not mitigated due 
company constrains and the parameters for the risk environment are not accurately 
defined. They also argue that security requirement-based approach for risk assessment 
would be better solution than using traditional approaches. 
2.8 OCTAVE Allegro 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation Allegro (OCTAVE 
Allegro) is a widely used risk assessment method developed by researchers at the 
Carnegie Mellon University in 2007. It was developed to identify, analyse, and prioritize 
information security risks (Liu et. al., 2009). Based on the results of OCTAVE Allegro 
risk assessment process, information security professionals can identify information 
security risks and create a prioritized list of mitigation strategies by developing security 
measures to reduce the effects of risk realization. 
Alberts and Dorofee (2003) introduce how OCTAVE process works. The method consists 
of three phases: building of asset-based threat profiles, identification of infrastructure 
vulnerabilities and development of security strategy and plans. During first phase, the 
organizational view is created by focusing on people acting in the organization. During 
second phase, the technical view is created by focusing on the infrastructure used inside 
the organization. During third phase, organizational and technical view are gathered for 
evaluation. First the risks are defined from the views and then two workshops are held to 
propose protection strategy, risk mitigation plans and action list, and approve them. 
Advantages of OCTAVE Allegro are easy to follow process with clear steps to follow 
during the risk assessment. The process insists experts to investigate areas that would 
have been otherwise not been checked, and templates and worksheets are useful tools to 
help with the assessment. Disadvantages include troubles with learning the process since 
it is found overwhelming for beginners, single phase consumes a lot of time and the 
results are not found satisfactory and it is easy to lose focus and prioritization during the 
process (Wangen, 2017). Muhammad Asif Khan (2017) also argues that OCTAVE 
Allegro is good and simple approach to risk assessment for small teams which have 
experienced employees working in them. 
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2.9 GBM-OA 
Päivärinta et. al. (2014) introduce a risk assessment method based on genres combined 
with OCTAVE approach (GBM-OA). The process is iterative, and it consist of seven 
steps: Definition of stakeholders for security risk analysis, definition of risk measurement 
criteria, definition of producers and users of information, identification of genres of 
communication, development of information asset profile with genre properties, 
identification of containers and identification or risks and mitigation strategies. First, the 
participants for the assessment are picked by defined leader, preferably someone from 
management. Second, the risk evaluation scope and priorities are defined. Output of this 
step will help with the risk definition. Third, the genres are defined which represent for 
example people or units. These genres move information between each other using some 
method of communication and use the information for something. The definition of these 
communication methods is done in step four. Fifth, properties of all genres are defined. 
These properties can be used to find assets from the communication between genres. 
Sixth, containers for information assets are defined. The important thing in this step is to 
find out what assets lie inside the communication. Lastly, risks against the assets and 
mitigation strategies to prevent or mitigate the risks are defined. 
 








Initial experiences of the framework were collected from three master’s degree students 
who participated in a course in which the framework was introduced (Päivärinta et al., 
2014). The students wrote learning journals, risk assessment document, reflective 
journals and conducted interviews to talk about their own experiences of using the 
framework. The evaluation pointed out three main topics: 1) It takes time to understand 
the terminology and risk assessment process, but after getting familiar with the framework 
it gives detailed organisation- and knowledge-oriented focus on risk assessment. 2) 
Focusing only to genres during the risk assessment ignores the security risks related to 
physical and electronic information assets and asset containers. 3) The framework was 
easy to use, structured and flexible. Even though the framework gives good insight on 
risks on organizational level, Päivärinta et al. (2014) want to point out that in big 
organizations prioritization of the genres may prove difficult. Organization might have 
thousands of genres that should be considered during the risk assessment, analysis, and 
documentation of all those genres would not be cost efficient and resources would be 
spent on definition of risks which would have minor or insignificant impact on the 
organization. Instead of trying to analyse all possible genres, organization should select 
which genres are business-critical and which genres might contain risks which would 
cause major losses for the organization. 
2.10 Conclusion of the review 
In this section I have discussed about information security risk management and 
frameworks developed to conduct risk assessment. Organizations rely on technological 
solutions to conduct their business efficiently. Due to this, lot of organizations’ assets are 
vulnerable to attacks. Information security risk management is important working 
practice to secure companies’ business assets and protect themselves against threats. Risk 
management consists of several components, and the one in focus in this thesis is risk 
assessment, which is the identification and evaluation of risks. There are several risk 
assessment frameworks available which can be used to conduct risk assessment in 
different contexts. These frameworks can be categorized as qualitative and quantitative 
frameworks. Qualitative frameworks focus on expertise of people working in the 
organization and the risks are identified by discussing about the environment and 
technological solutions used by the organization. Quantitative frameworks rely on 
statistical data about risks identified in the industry, evaluation of their cost impact and 
the probability of occurrence. With these variables it is possible to calculate the priority 
of risks. As in quantitative frameworks, also in qualitative frameworks it is important to 
prioritize risks, since in big organizations it is almost impossible to mitigate all identified 
risks, and some of them need to be accepted. 
In the literature review I have introduced different frameworks which are suitable to 
basically any context, and I have also introduced frameworks specialized in cloud 
environment. Since organizations are starting to rely on cloud solutions to decrease 
infrastructural costs, there has been a need for risk assessment frameworks which take 
cloud environment characteristics into account. There is no strict rule which risk 
assessment framework should be used in given situation, but the selection depends 
heavily on the context of the case and the risk assessor needs to think about how different 
approaches would work in their case. 
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3. Methodology 
In this section, I will introduce the study conducted in this thesis. The objective of this 
section is to discuss about how the study was conducted, what tools were used and 
describe how the research process was followed in the study.  
3.1 Research questions 
Research questions answered in this thesis are: 
RQ 1.1: What kind of risk assessment frameworks are available? 
RQ 1.2: What kind of risk assessment frameworks are suitable for cloud environment? 
RQ 2: How to implement risk assessment framework GBM-OA in practice? 
RQ 3: How well GBM-OA suits to case context? 
Research question 1 was discussed in section 2. Question 1.1 is about what kind of risk 
assessment frameworks are available. The goal of the research question is to find some 
information about different frameworks and how they differ. The question is answered 
by looking into previous research conducted about risk assessment frameworks. Question 
1.2 is similar to question 1.1, but the goal is to investigate frameworks which are tailored 
for cloud environment. Question is also answered by looking into previous research. 
Research question 2 is about implementing GBM-OA into practise. The goal of the 
questions is to describe how to implement this framework to described context. The 
description of the context can be found from section 3.3. Answer to the question can be 
found from section 3.4.3. 
Research question 3 is about experiences from the practical implementation. The goal of 
the question is to find out if GBM-OA is suitable risk assessment framework for the given 
context. Answer to this question can be found from section 3.4.4. 
3.2 Research method 
To find answer to the research questions, canonical action research (CAR) method was 
used. The method was first introduced by Susman and Evered (1978). The method is 
based on action research, which was developed in the aftermath of World War Two to 
take actions against social problems associated with battlefield experiences (Trist & 
Bamforth, 1951). After the issues were solved, action research has gone over major 
development and refinement. After 1990, action research was accepted as a legit research 
method in information systems domain. Several publications have been created to only 





Canonical action research process is described in figure 8. It consists of five steps: 
diagnosis, action planning, intervention, evaluation, and reflection (Davidson et. al., 
2012). Diagnosis is the entry point for the process. In this phase, justification for the 
research is defined. There must be a reason why this research should be conducted for 
this context. During second phase, the actions to implement change are planned. During 
third phase, the plan is executed, and the planned actions will be done. During fourth 
phase, the implementation process is evaluated. The objective is to identify how the 
change has affected the environment. During the last step, the researcher reflects the 
process and tries to identify the key learnings from the process to communicate to the 
scientific community to append general knowledge (Malaurent & Avison, 2016). 
 
Figure 8. Canonical Action Research process 
 
Olsson and Henfridsson (2005) provide a practical example of action research in 
development of context-aware application that transcend the mainstream design agenda 
in context-aware computing. During diagnosis phase, a collaborative workshop was held 
with researchers and practitioners and the key challenges in car infotainment systems. 
During action planning phase, actions to be done were defined to test how an interactional 
view of context would affect design adapted to their setting. During intervention phase, 
the prototype for the setting was developed. Evaluation phase took two months and during 
the phase semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted to verify that the design 









To evaluate how well the selected risk assessment framework works in the given context, 
qualitative semi-structured interviews are used to collect data from research participants. 
Qualitative approach for the evaluation is selected because qualitative approaches 
contribute to understanding of the human behaviour in different contexts and in a 
particular situation (Bengtsson, 2016). Since this thesis is about empirical evaluation, to 
get data about experiences from the risk assessment framework from the assessment 
participants, semi-structured interviews are conducted. Using interviews, it is possible to 
get participants insights about the process and it is possible to reflect what were the good 
and the bad things (Horton et. al., 2004). Semi-structured interviews are the most common 
case of interviews, since it gives straight guideline to follow for the interviewer but also 
it gives flexibility to follow a lead which appears during the interview. In addition, semi-
structured format allows free discussion between interviewer and interviewee which helps 
interviewee to give wider data to interviewer. It is also possible that a bond between 
interviewer and interviewee may be established which makes the interview situation feel 
lighter and the interviewee is able to answer truthfully and think the questions through 
(Kallio et. al., 2016). 
3.3 Research context 
Research in software industry is heavily depended on the context of the research. Results 
from one study may not be applicable to another since the context is different (Dybå et. 
al., 2012). According to Schatzki (2002), recognizing the influence of context is 
important, because it determines the phenomenon and shapes the practices within it. For 
this reason, I will introduce the context of this study. Target company of the study 
conducted in this thesis is referred as target company (TC) to prevent reveal of business 
sensitive information. 
3.3.1 Continuous integration & continuous deployment 
Continuous integration (CI) is a software practise where developers integrate code 
frequently, at least once in a day. It is popular practise in software development, since it 
allows merging small changes quickly and developers get fast feedback (Beck, 1999). 
Continuous deployment (CD) is a practise which aims to rapid delivery of software to 
customers using automated building, testing and deployment (Humble & Farley, 2010). 
Closely related to CI/CD is DevOps process. DevOps is a combination of development 
and operations and means culture shift towards collaboration between development, 
quality assurance and operations (Ebert et. al., 2016). 
3.3.2 Case description 
TC has established a service to centralize CI/CD solutions. The service is referred as 
target service (TS) to prevent reveal of business-critical information in this thesis. TS is 
an environment where projects are able to build, test and deploy software to their 
customers. Development, maintenance, and support for the service is handled by global 
team located on multiple time zones. Aim of the team is to support projects in CI/CD 
process and spread the DevOps working practices to developers. 
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TS environment consists of multiple different components, including version control, 
CI/CD tools and physical servers. Git is used as version control tool, Jenkins as CI/CD 
environment, Puppet for server management, Docker to provide container build resources 
for projects and Artifactory as artefact storage. These are just few examples of the 
components used in TS. 
Cloud environment has been raising trend for few years and companies are starting to use 
or move to cloud solutions to outsource their infrastructure. Cloud allows independence 
of location and devices and it is highly available and scalable (Wyld, 2009). TS is 
currently using physical servers hosting a Docker swarm to provide resources for projects. 
In addition to TS provided swarm, projects are using their own physical servers as 
resources. TC has a department which is responsible for physical servers inside TC. 
Hence, TS is heavily dependent of that department. If problems occur in the servers, 
problems are reflected to projects through TS. To mitigate this risk, and due to the facts 
introduced above, TS team has planned to move from physical server environment to 
cloud. Using cloud solution, TS team has direct control of the environment and they are 
able to control it directly. Also, risks regarding maintenance of the servers and scalability 
can be moved from TS to third party. 
3.4 Research design and findings 
As described in section 3.2, canonical action research consists of five steps: diagnosis, 
action planning, intervention, evaluation, and reflection. In this section I will describe 
how this process is implemented in this thesis. 
3.4.1 Diagnosis 
First phase of the process is the diagnosis of the situation. As described in section 3.3.2, 
target service is planning to move from physical server environment to cloud. There are 
two cloud solution which are planned to be used in the future: in-house solution and 
Amazon Web Service (AWS). In-house solution would be customizable, and the control 
is completely inside TC. AWS is the leading cloud environment with flexible solution 
providing high availability, strong support for enterprises and scalable build, test, and 
deployment environment. AWS is accessible from both web browser and client console 
(Lee et al., 2010). In both of these solutions, security issues need to be addressed. Since 
TS provides a centralized CI/CD solution used by TC inner customers, project specific 
business sensitive information needs to be secured. Working in cloud environment is 
fairly new for TS team, need for risk assessment has been identified. 
To identify what approach would be optimal for TS team, discussions with team manager 
and project manager were held. The objective of these discussions was to identify what 
framework could be used for the context of TS team. Since the team is small compared 
to other project teams in TC, it is important to find a lightweight solution which would 
not use many resources of the team. Also, the framework should be optimal for evaluation 
in this thesis. Conclusion of these discussions were to use GBM-OA approach described 
in section 2.9. Reasoning for this selection was that the workflow of the framework is 
clear, templates for the steps in the framework are developed and provided by the 
developers of the framework and the process is easily repeatable, which would allow 
usage of the framework in the future. 
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3.4.2 Action planning 
The risk assessment process was split into three workshops. These workshops took one 
hour each. First workshop consisted of steps from GBM 1 to OA 2. Second workshop 
focused on OA 3 and the last workshop focused on OA 4-8. The reason for splitting the 
process into three parts was, that to run through the process successfully it is important 
that participants are active during the workshops. To ensure that participants will not be 
too tired to give their opinions about the subject at hand it was necessary to keep the 
workshops short, especially when the risks were identified. 
The first step of the risk assessment process was about selecting who will be participating 
in the risk assessment. According to instructions of GBM-OA, one person is selected to 
be the leader of the process. This person should be someone from the management. Rest 
of the participants should have proper expertise to participate because the process relies 
heavily on the knowledge of the participants. To ensure successful completion of the 
process, discussions with the process leader were held to select suitable personnel. 
The second step is to define scopes for the risk that will be identified during final steps. 
The goal is to focus only on strategically important areas. To get most out of the process, 
it is important to focus on the most important areas and not take all possible situations 
into consideration. The focus areas of the assessment were discussed with the participants 
during the first workshop session. The defined scope was reflected during later steps. 
Third step begins the actual assessment actions. During this step, the producers and users 
of information will be defined. Definition of producers and users will give an overview 
of the environment and how information is moved inside the environment. Producers of 
information are players in the environment which produce some valuable information to 
some other player and the users depend on that information. This flow of information 
connects the players together and this connection helps the environment produce value. 
Hence, it is important to secure flow of information and make sure that no actor outside 
the environment can access the information moving inside the environment. On the other 
hand, to prevent misuse of information or unauthorized access it is also important to make 
sure that only the user(s) which are dependent on the information will get it and no other 
player inside the environment is able to access the information. 
The fourth step consists of identification of genres of communication. The genres 
represent the flow of information inside the environment. The information is produced by 
producers of information and used by users of information. Together, producers and users 
of information form the chain in which the information goes through. The vectors which 
are used to transfer information between producers and users varies from physical copies 
to spoken exchange of information. To enable identification of informational assets it is 
important to identify what is the actual information moving inside the environment, how 
the information is exchanged between producers and users and what could possibly 
disturb or alter the flow of information. To successfully identify the genres, active 
participation is required since there might be hidden information moving inside the 





The last part of the first session was about defining detailed description of the genres and 
try to find out which of the genres have potential security threats. This step is important 
since it is hard to define all possible risks for all identified genres, so the genres need to 
be prioritized according to the threat probability and the scope of the assessment. The 
management representative plays important role in this step, since he/she can give 
information about how much resources there is available for mitigation activities, which 
can be reflected during the prioritization. If there are not many resources available, then 
genres possibly containing easy and quick mitigation activities should be prioritized and 
vice versa. 
The second session was about focusing on identification of containers. As described in 
section 2.9, containers are detailed descriptions about how the genres move between 
producer and user of information. Using the containers, it is possible to see what risks 
could affect the movement of the information from producer to user. Inside the container 
description the movement of information is considered from both producer and user point 
of view. Also, the people or roles involved in the movement of information are defined. 
Diagonal matrix and Genre list defined during the first session will be used during the 
identification of containers to keep in mind the whole picture of the environment. Same 
roles will be participating in the second session as in the first session and one hour will 
be reserved for the session. Before the session, researcher prepared the container 
templates for all genres defined in the genre list to reduce the amount of time used for 
copying templates multiple times during the session. 
The third session was about actual risks connected to the information that is moving inside 
the environment. During the third session, participants were discussing about the actual 
risks inside the containers and try to find possible follow-up actions on the risks. In the 
risk assessment, quality is more important that quantity. This means that we tried to 
identify few risks as detailed as possible rather than trying to identify large quantity of 
risks with few details. Also, to get as much value from the session as possible, participants 
were focusing on risks that could be mitigated. In practice, participants selected one or 
two containers defined during the second session and tried to identify risks that could be 
mitigated. At the end of the session participants needed to decide if they wanted to have 
another session for identification of risks or if they want to stop. It is not necessary to 
identify every single risk in the environment since we wanted to find out the most critical 
ones that need to be fixed or mitigated first. Because of this, participants needed to decide 
if the defined risks were enough for now or if there might be something critical still hiding 
inside the containers. 
3.4.3 Intervention 
In this section I will describe how the planned actions were executed. Notes taken from 
the assessment sessions can be found from appendix A. Examples of outputs from each 
session are also provided. The outputs are described in abstract level due to confidential 





During the first assessment session the process was executed from GBM 1 – OA 2. At 
the beginning of the session, a quick recap about the process steps was done to motivate 
and inform the participants about what we are doing during the process. Document was 
prepared and pre-filled by the researcher to save time. Risk areas and scopes was 
predefined by the researcher and accepted by the participants. Most important parts of the 
session were the identification of producers and users of information and identification 
of genres of communication. Diagonal matrix and detailed genre list created during the 
session. The participants were not very active at the beginning of the session because the 
session was scheduled after a long meeting and there was not enough time given for the 
participants to recover from the meeting. Participants did active after a while and 
discussions started to flow. The biggest challenge during the session was to stay inside 
the scope accepted at the beginning of the session. It is easy to start defining producers 
and users of information and genres about the whole environment, but to focus on singular 
area takes away most of the parts from the whole picture. But even with this challenge 
the participants were able to define diagonal matrix of the producers and users of 
information and the genre list within the scope and they can be used during following 
steps. 
 
Figure 9. PUI matrix from session 1. Details have been changed due confidentiality. 
 







The second session started faster than the first session, since the participants were already 
aware where we left off last time and what we will go through during this session. A quick 
recap of the outcome of the first session was done at the beginning to get everyone on the 
same page if someone would have forgotten where we left off. The researched had done 
manual copy work for the container template to save time. Each genre from the genre list 
was gone through and the container was filled for each genre. The participants were able 
to define a container for each genre in the list and they can be used in the following third 
and last session. At the end of the session a quick peek on the following session was done 
to give participant heads up about what we will be doing in the third session. 
Third session started late due to extension of meeting before the session, but the start was 
quick since the introduction of the session was done at the end of the second session. Risk 
identification was done by participants selecting few containers and discussing what risks 
could be found inside the containers. After risks were found, risk worksheets were filled 
for each risk. While filling the template, participants had hard time understanding what 
each part of the template was meaning. After some discussion, participants found 
consensus about the meanings and they managed to fill the worksheet for all risks except 
the last one, because there was not enough time. The last worksheet was filled by 
participants giving their own input by email and researcher filled the missing parts using 
the answers given by the participants through email. This session concluded the risk 
assessment process. 
 
Table 2. One example of containers defined in session 2. Details have been changed due 
confidentiality. 
To answer the research question 2, this framework provided one possible implementation 
of risk assessment in practice. To summarize the assessment process, first the participants 
defined the environment and how the different players in the environment are connected 
to each other. This gave an overview of the whole environment to the participants which 
was reviewed when the assets were identified. Second step is to identify what are the 
assets that need to be protected. Third step is to identify what threats would cause harm 
to those assets and how can we protect them against those threats. As said, this process is 
just one possibility and it might not suite for all environments. 
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Table 3. One risk defined in session 3. Some of the details are changed due confidentiality. 
3.4.4 Evaluation 
As described in section 3.2, to evaluate the risk assessment framework in context of 
centralized CI/CD environment, semi-structured interviews were held with the 
participants. Questions presented in the interview are listed in appendix 5.2. During the 
interviews, the interviewer was taking notes about the answers and after the interview 
was done, the notes were sent to interviewee to check that the notes are correct. The 
interviewees could also modify them if found necessary. This was found necessary, since 
interviewer was not able to record the interviews according to guidelines of the TC, and 
to verify that the participants can confirm that they have answered as pointed in the notes.  
References to the answers provided in this section are not pointed to any specific role to 
protect anonymity of the participants.  
Before the actual risk assessment work was started, an introductory session was held for 
the participants to familiarize them with the framework. Initially the participants felt that 
the framework is heavy. There are multiple steps that need to be taken before the actual 
risk definition can begin. Participants were concerned that we would be spending too 
much time on filling pre-defined templates which would not give any new value for the 
team. 
“I felt that it required us to fill lots of stuff to pre-defined templates.” 
“There was lot of new stuff, so it was hard to understand the overall picture in the 






Since the framework is defined with detailed steps from beginning to actual risk 
definition, participants felt that this assessment process is strict, and it does not have room 
for flexibility. Terminology used in the framework was confusing, especially the term 
“genre” caused confusing in participants. The framework contained lot of new things for 
the participants, hence it was hard to understand after the introduction. To counter this 
concern, participants hoped that they could have had an example from previous risk 
assessment with this framework to give practical example how the steps of the framework 
should be executed. 
“Initially it was hard to familiarize with the framework, especially with the terminology 
used in it.” 
“Example from previous risk assessment using this framework would had maybe help 
participants to understand the process better.” 
On the other hand, some participants thought this as a good thing, since we do not have 
to spend time on defining how we want to conduct risk assessment, since the steps are 
already defined. Also, since the steps were defined in detail, income and outcome of each 
step was clear. Because we do not have to spend time on defining how the steps should 
be executed, we can focus on the actual assessment without spending time on things that 
do not give any value to the assessment. All the participants agreed that the framework is 
a good thing to try out in this context and it is needed for the environment, but they were 
not sure if it is suitable. 
“Framework will provide valuable information without spending too much time.” 
“I felt that this is a good thing that should be conducted to our environment.” 
“All in all, I felt that this is a good framework to try out in our environment.” 
Since the answers presented above are based on the knowledge from introductory session, 
the participants were asked about their feelings when the assessment started to see if their 
feelings had changes when the actual work started. First steps of the actual work in the 
framework (PUI matrix, genre list) were found important since they give an overview of 
the environment and they help when thinking about where the risks would be coming and 
how they would affect the whole environment if risks realize. It was found that it is 
especially important to understand how the different entities in the environment are linked 
to each other. Risk of losing focus and getting sidetracked during the assessment was 
presented as the main risk that could cause failure of assessment. 
“I feel that it is important to understand who is interested about who and how different 
players are linked to each other.” 
“There is always a risk when conducting risk assessment that we get sidetracked and lose 






One interesting concern was that since the team is making big changes and moving to 
new infrastructure, the team does not know what the impacts of risks are if they realize. 
This shows the importance of people involved in risk assessment, since it is possible that 
the assessment fails because the participants do not have necessary understanding of the 
environment in security point of view. The concern was also verified by the participants 
since they were worried about how they can bring value to the assessment, since they are 
not confident in their own expertise in the field. 
“We are moving towards big changes which we are not familiar with, so we are not sure 
what are the impacts if the assumptions realize.” 
“We know basic things, like what would happen if cloud VMs would crash of networks 
would go down. We are able to contribute only in that level, but we don't know what 
actual problems would arise in cloud environment.” 
After the initial feelings about the framework were collected, participants were asked to 
describe their feelings the after the assessment when the results are not taken into 
consideration. Participants were worried that this assessment was one more process which 
showed that these are the problems which we have, and the team is not going to do 
anything about them. The team already has a lot of documentation and the outcomes of 
the framework can get lost with the other documents. During the assessment sessions we 
had to stop the work to find out what some parts mean, for example the impact definitions 
in asset worksheet. These interruptions caused loss of time in the sessions and the flow 
of discussion was lost. The concern about lack of expertise was also raised after the 
assessment, since participants were not sure if we were able to define correct 
measurement metrics for the risks, since participants did not have detailed technical 
understanding of the new environment. 
“I felt concerned that this process is just another discussion where we find problems, but 
we won't be doing anything to fix those problems.” 
“We found several unclarities like how to write things down, but we were able to complete 
the assessment.” 
“I was concerned about if we were able to define metrics for the risks correctly, since we 
are lacking expertise in cloud platform.” 
The participants were surprised how little time the assessment took. We were able to find 
relevant risks without spending much time. This was a surprise to the participants since 
initially the framework seemed heavy, but at the end it was lighter than it seemed. In 
addition to the risks found in the assessment, participants also got a good understanding 
about the environment, since we had to think about how different producers and users of 
information work together. People involved in the assessment had experience from other 
risk assessment frameworks and they felt that GBM-OA is the least heavy and time 
consuming when compared to other risk assessment framework they had used. 
“All in all, I felt that the process went well, and I was surprised how little time it took to 
get to these results.” 
“After the assessment we got a good picture of what the future infrastructure will be, and 
the framework was helpful in achieving that.” 
“I feel that it is important to understand who is interested about who and how different 
players are linked to each other.” 
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Results of the assessment were not surprising for the participants. They already had some 
ideas about what kind of risks are present, so it was expected that the results were not 
surprising. Value provided by the framework was the prioritization since the risks were 
not prioritized before. One participant compared the results to previous experiences with 
other frameworks and he/she thought that the other frameworks would have produced 
similar results. Since the framework gives weight to participants expertise and 
understanding of the environment, participants thought that we are not able to verify 
accurately if the results are correct, since they are mostly assumptions. Team can verify 
them only if they realize. In addition to risks themselves, participants were able to get 
new insight about the environment, which was additional value created by the framework. 
“The results were not surprising.” 
“We were able to get a good overall picture of the environment and map the risks to 
responsible people with proper mitigation plans.” 
“We can't really say if the results were right or wrong, since they can be verified only if 
they realize, since they are mostly assumptions.” 
When participants were asked about their opinion about the most valuable and invaluable 
steps, the opinions were very divided between participants. PUI matrix was seen valuable 
since gave good overview about the environment and how the team communicates with 
the stakeholders. Information containers gave insight about how the information is moved 
from producer to user and which people are involved in the process. Information asset 
worksheets were found valuable since they gave wide description of the risk, it helped 
with risk prioritization and mitigation activities were defined. At the same time, each of 
these steps were criticized. Templates were found to be compelling to fill due to 
repetition, information containers were found to be unnecessary work, impact areas in 
information asset worksheet were too abstract and participants had hard time to stay 
focused on the subject. At the end it was found that each of these steps are necessary to 
successfully complete the assessment and none of them can be left out. With these 
statements it is hard to say if any of the steps in the framework would be useless or 
invaluable. 
“The most valuable part was the definition of PUI matrix, where we discussed about our 
environment. It's good to think about how we collaborate with our stakeholders.” 
“The information containers gave us good understanding about all pieces of our 
environment, which helped us to get common understanding of our environment.” 
“Information asset worksheet was the most valuable part of the framework, but I don't 
find the other parts unnecessary, since they helped us in risk definition.” 
“Describing information assets is not fun work and we had hard time to find suitable 
words to describe the assets, so I found it to be hard to stay focused on the subject.” 
“Impact areas in the worksheet were too abstract and I don't think they are suitable for 
every scenario. They should be modified regarding the context.” 




When talking about which roles should be present in the assessment, participants found 
it critical that one participant from each producer and user of information should be 
present. They could give their own insight about how information is used and how they 
are responsible of genres in their opinion. Product Owner was found to be very important 
role to be present since he/she is doing the high-level prioritization and is actively 
communicating with the stakeholders. Number of engineers working on actual 
implementations was also found important, since technical insight and understanding was 
found to be key success factor in definition of security risks. At the same time, it is 
important that there are not too many participants involved in the assessment since that 
would slow the assessment process down and delay other daily tasks. Scrum Master was 
found unnecessary since technical details are not his/her area of responsibility. 
Participants also suggested that the number of participants should be adjusted in each step 
of the framework. 
“It is really important that Product Owner is present in these discussions, since he's the 
one who does the high-level prioritization about what we will be doing.” 
“Scrum master is not necessary role in this process, since technical details are not his 
responsibility.” 
About how well the framework suits in context of centralized CI/CD environment (RQ 
3), participants felt that it does not suit well as it is. Even though it brings value with 
definition of environment and risks, it is too strict and has too many steps to be executed 
every now and then. It should be modified so that it would be more lightweight with fever 
steps and it should be integrated into the development process instead of being individual 
process. Participants felt that the framework does not give enough value as separate 
process but if integrated to the development process it would give the team more value. 
In addition to value creation, participants felt that they do not want any more additional 
documentation and filling of all the templates is compelling. Team already has much 
documentation, so saving results as additional documentation is not recommended. 
Participants liked the fact that they did not have to spend much time for the assessment, 
but modification to continuous process was found to be hard. 
“The framework was not suitable in our context as it is, but it should be integrated into 
our development process. I feel that the assessment doesn't give value to us if it is separate 
discussion outside development work.” 
“Changing this framework to continuous process needs to be discussed, since I don't find 
it easy to modify this process to continuous process.” 








Improvement suggestions were collected from the participants and the biggest 
improvement areas were the structure of information asset worksheet and the iteration of 
the framework. One of the concerns regarding information asset worksheet template was 
the impact areas. The areas differ depending on the context of the assessment and the 
framework does not take this into account. It was suggested that there would be a step in 
the framework where the participants are requested to discuss what are the most important 
impact areas which should be used when the risk impacts are being evaluated. This could 
be additional step in the framework, or it should be integrated into one of the steps. 
Suggested change is presented in figure 10 below. The framework also indicates that the 
process can be done iteratively, but there are not any instructions about how often the 
process should be iterated and how it should be iterated. Hence the users of the framework 
must take time to figure it out themselves, which does not give much credit to the 
framework. Some instructions or examples should be provided in the framework 
description. 
“It would be useful to have a step in the process where participants define most important 
impact areas which would be used when risk impacts are defined.” 
“There could be instructions about how to make the process continuous. Also, it should 
be defined how often the process should be iterated.” 
 
Figure 10. Suggested GBM-OA assessment process. 
In conclusion, based on the discussions had with the participants it can be stated that the 
framework provides additional value with the risks and mitigation actions, but it is not 
suitable to centralized CI/CD environment without slight modifications. The main 
concern is that the assessment process should be integrated to development process, so it 
would be part of daily work. Iterating the framework as separate process will consume 
time from other activities, and the team does not want that the results of the process would 




Since successful DevOps practices already require knowledge about multiple different 
tools, information security should not be added as additional practice to DevOps 
practices. It should be integrated into existing solutions or integrated into DevOps 
practices. In section 2.4 I have discussed about DevSecOps and how it can be used to 
integrate security aspects to DevOps practices. One of the problems in information 
security risk assessment found in this study was that the assessment process was found as 
an additional process outside development and operations. Adaption of DevSecOps 
practices could solve this problem in the TS on the other hand, adaption of DevSecOps 
in an organization requires implementation of DevOps and the practices described above. 
This is lot to take in and it requires resources. This may be a reason why organization 
would not want to use DevSecOps, but instead use just DevOps and conduct security 
related assessment and audits now and then. As noticed in this study, this additional 
security risk assessment felt compelling for the people participating in the assessment and 
they needed to stop their daily work to participate. This is a tradeoff that needs to be 
discussed inside organization. 
When talking about DevSecOps, it is important to make sure that the security related 
activities do not disturb development and operations work. Since GBM-OA is individual 
process now, it should be integrated into development. To enable this, the framework 
should be split into individual steps, which would be executed at some points of 
development. For example, when a new feature is planned, it should be evaluated against 
different genres. Deployment of features can be evaluated against different containers. 
These possible integrations would make the framework as a natural part of daily work. 
At the end, it is management decision how information security will be handled in a 
company or organization. If management does not care about information security, 
consequences may be severe. This can be seen from latest news about security breach in 
psychotherapy center Vastaamo, which turned public in September 2020. The first breach 
happened in 2018, but management decided to hide the event from public. When the 
attackers noticed that they have managed to steal confidential patient records, they started 
to blackmail the company for ransom. This could have been avoided if management 
decided to be transparent about the first breach and improve their security measures. This 
is a warning example that information security should be taken seriously, and resources 
should be allocated to ensure confidential information is secured. 
4.1 Reflection 
GBM-OA is based on how the information moves inside the environment from producers 
to users, and how that flow of information can be compromised. Without wide 
understanding of the environment, the framework does not give much value to the users. 
Hence the participants had to really think about what information the team provides and 
who are the actual users of that information. This raised interesting discussions between 
the participants, and it was clear that the participants were not completely aware who are 
responsible of different genres. This outcome raises a concern that if the results of the 




DevOps is swiftly developing culture nowadays since companies are continuously trying 
to develop faster and more automated way to integrate development and operations 
together. To do this efficiently, teams are required to integrate multiple different solutions 
and tools together to achieve this goal, for example build and testing tools. Ebert et al. 
(2016) present a list of different automation tools available to create efficient CI/CD 
pipeline. Even though it is a good thing that there are multiple solutions available to build 
CI/CD pipeline, the amount of expertise required from DevOps engineers is growing. It 
is not enough anymore that engineers are experts of one or few tools, but engineers need 
to know how to use multiple tools. A study conducted by Lwakatare et. al. (2019) shows 
that even though the team would consist of experienced engineers, adaption of DevOps 
principles in practice was found compelling and they struggled with the learning curve. 
They also state that if the team is not professional enough in different DevOps tools, 
information security of the environment will get compromised. 
The results from this study show how the DevOps mindset reflects to information security 
risk assessment. Jaabari et. al. (2016) presents a list of DevOps practices that should be 
implemented when adopting DevOps into company or organization. These practices show 
how important it is to automate everything from software development to deployment. 
Hence, developers aim towards automation and processes affecting software development 
should be integrated into either software development cycle or automation. Because of 
this way of thinking, participants felt compelled about separation of security risk 
assessment from development. 
In section 2.3, I have presented different challenges regarding information security risk 
management. In this study, GBM-OA provided some solutions to these problems. On the 
other hand, some problems were clearly visible in the framework. Challenges 1 and 5 are 
taken into consideration in the framework. Challenge 1 was about inventory of assets 
growing larger and larger if the assessor tries to identify everything that might be an asset 
to the organization. GBM-OA tries to stick in the high-level flow of information, and 
details are only talked about during last steps of the framework. In addition, framework 
emphasizes the focus of the assessment, and it is important to keep the focus during the 
assessment, so there would not be too big inventory of assets after one run. Challenge 5 
was about knowledge sharing between experts. It is necessary to share knowledge 
between experts to reduce cost of knowledge acquisition during risk management. At the 
beginning of GBM-OA the leader of the assessment selects which personnel will 
participate in the risk assessment. Idea here is to select people with different areas of 
expertise to make the pool of knowledge in the assessment wide. This is very important, 
since the framework relies on expertise of the participants. 
Challenges 2, 3, 4 and 6 were visible also during this study. Challenge 2 showed concern 
that it is difficult to set meaningful values for the risks. As seen in the evaluation of the 
framework, there should be a step in the framework which would help the participants in 
definition of key impact areas and definition of risk values. Challenge 3 Showed that it is 
difficult the predict how the threats would attack against the assets, since the focus of 
interest changes due time. This challenge is not considered in the framework. Challenge 
4 showed that management tends to be overconfident about their assets, and every critical 
risk is not taken into consideration. Since representative of management is the one leading 
the assessment, this challenge is clearly visible. Challenge 6 showed that the costs of 
countermeasures should not exceed the possible losses if a risk realizes. Framework does 
not take this into account, since only thing that is considered is that how the participants 
would like to handle the risk. They could accidentally or on purpose define too radical 
countermeasures. 
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At section 2.4, six challenges regarding practical implementation of DevSecOps culture 
were introduced. These challenges are similar to challenges presented for GBM-OA 
framework. For example, successful information security risk assessment with GBM-OA 
requires participation of security experts, since the framework relies on experience of the 
participants. In addition, framework requires that the participants need to think about 
security as part of their development work. If organization has successfully implemented 
DevSecOps practicalities in their development work, it is easier to conduct successful risk 
assessment, since the organization already has experienced employees and required 
security mindset. Since security is a natural part of software development in DevSecOps 
practise, GBM-OA should be easy to integrate into security related work. 
4.2 Answers to research questions 
First research question was about what kind of risk assessment frameworks are 
available and what kind of risk assessment frameworks are suitable for cloud 
environment? Risk assessment frameworks can be divided into two categories: 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative methods focus on expertise of people 
and the risks are identified through discussions. Quantitative methods focus on possibility 
of occurrence and losses if risk realizes. Risks are calculated according to estimates. Risk 
assessment framework used in this study, GBM-OA, is an example of qualitative method. 
One quantitative framework introduced in this paper is ISRAM. For cloud environment, 
additional layer of security needs to be taken into consideration, since cloud services are 
in many cases provided by a third party. Hence, it is important to make sure that the 
selected provider is taking security seriously, services are configured in secure way and 
connection between internal servers and cloud services is secure. Different frameworks 
take cloud into consideration in different ways. For example, ISGcloud emphasizes on 
governance and analysis of cloud security, while QUIRC focuses on individual security 
objectives defined by the organization conducting risk assessment. In any case, it is 
important to make sure that data is secure in the cloud environment. 
Second research question was about how to implement risk assessment framework 
GBM-OA in practice? GBM-OA consist of defining stakeholders of security risk 
analysis, definition of risk measurement criteria, identification of producers and users of 
information, identifying genres of communication, development of information asset 
profiles with genre properties, identification of containers and identification of risks and 
mitigation strategies. In this case study, the process was cut into three workshops to make 
sure that content would not be too heavy for the participants. Before the workshops, 
introductory sessions about the framework was held for the participants so they were able 
to familiarize with the framework before starting the work. During workshops, internal 
documentation was created represent producers and users of information, genres, 
containers, and risks. Time available for the workshops was limited, so focus had to be 
on few detailed risks in case of having multiple risks with little details. At the end, 
participants were satisfied with the results. 
Third research question was about how well GBM-OA suits to case context? Qualitative 
semi-structured interviews were conducted to find answer to this question. According to 
the answers from the interviews, the framework does not suit to the context as it is. Steps 
of the framework should be integrated into development process. In addition, participants 
suggested a new step to the framework, where most important impact areas for the context 
would be defined to produce more value from the framework to the context. Right now, 
there is no instructions in the framework about iteration of the assessment, so it would be 
useful to consider how the framework should be iterated efficiently. 
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4.3 Implications for research and methodology development 
In this study, it was clear that GBM-OA framework contains characteristics which are 
difficult to understand if the participants are not familiar with security risk assessment. 
During the assessment, participants with some experience from risk assessment did not 
have many difficulties, but participants with little experience with security risk 
assessment found it difficult to understand terminology and the steps used in the 
framework. Because of these difficulties, a lot of time was used in explaining what the 
terminology means and what the different steps are. When researchers are conducting a 
study about information security risk assessment frameworks, sufficient time should be 
granted for the participants to get familiar with the framework. This way the assessment 
will go through smoother, and the researcher can focus on making observations. 
For method development, it is necessary to try the framework out in different 
organizations. Since the framework is a qualitative approach that relies on the expertise 
of the participants, it is also important to take note how different participants behave 
during the assessment. During this study, it was noted that some participants do not like 
strict processes, and filling predefined documentation is not efficient and valuable. At the 
same time, some participants felt that predefined documentation and strict processes make 
it easy to use the framework, since participants do not have to define things themselves 
and they can focus on the risk assessment. It is important to find a compromise between 
these two opinions to make the framework suitable to as many use cases as possible. 
4.4 Implications for Practice 
Discussions with the participants during the study revealed, that security related 
assessments are not so common in the team. Security is usually discussed on higher level 
than in daily work. Exception are infrastructure related topics, where security always 
needs to be discussed. It was also revealed that the participants were not very familiar 
with different ways of conducting information security risk assessment. The team should 
be more included in security related discussions to raise awareness about information 
security to the team to make sure, that every member of the team knows the state of 
security in the software. This way, the team can more easily contribute for the security 
and raise their own concerns about it. 
For information security professionals, it can be noted that security is just one component 
in whole software development. Developers do not have all their time to focus on security, 
but they are required to focus on multiple different components. This is especially visible 
in DevOps culture. Therefore, there will always be some problems with security. Security 
professional should support individual developers by training them in context of security. 
In this study, participants were not sure about what are all possible vulnerabilities in the 
system, but they were sure that there are many. This shows that developers understand 
that there are vulnerabilities, but they do not know about them in detail. Security 
professionals can help developers by identifying the problems and teaching them how to 
avoid them. This way the developers can try and avoid creation of vulnerabilities.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this thesis I have discussed about information security risk assessment in context of 
centralized CI/CD environment. Since organization utilize automation in their business, 
much of their confidential information is stored to databases and information systems. 
These information assets can be valuable targets for attackers, and loss of confidential 
information can have devastating consequences for companies. Hence, companies have 
to invest in information security solutions to protect their information assets. 
Information security risk assessment is part of risk management, where you identify 
possible vulnerabilities against your assets which could be exploited by attackers and 
define countermeasures for those vulnerabilities. To help companies and organization to 
conduct successful information security risk assessment, multiple different frameworks 
has been developed. These frameworks can be divided to qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. Qualitative approaches focus on the people and they rely on the expertise and 
knowledge of participants. Quantitative frameworks focus on calculation of possible 
losses if risks realize, and the impact and severity of that risk is defined based on that 
estimation. Selection of suitable framework depends on the resources available for the 
assessment, expertise of staff and context of assessment target. 
In this thesis I have evaluated genre-based risk assessment framework GBM-OA by 
conducting security risk assessment in practice. After the assessment, interviews were 
conducted with participants to find out how well the framework suited in the context. 
Advantages of the framework found by the participants were the definition of 
environment and the needed time from beginning to the end. Drawbacks of the framework 
were the confusing terminology used in the framework and repetition in filling the 
templates. The findings from the study show that the framework is not suitable for the 
context since usage of the framework would require separate assessment iteration. The 
participants found that risk assessment should be integrated to development cycle and it 
should not be separate process. Improvement ideas for the framework proposed by the 
participants were adding one step to the framework where impact areas are defined and 
adding instructions about iteration of the framework. 
DevOps is rapidly evolving culture since companies are continuously trying to improve 
their software development towards automation and fast release cycles. This evolution 
might provide interesting aspects also towards security. This can already be seen from 
introduction of DevSecOps. Also, providers of the tools used in implementation of 
DevOps practices are trying to evolve. Current trend seems to be that the providers are 
trying to implement their own CI/CD pipelines (GitHub actions, JFrog pipelines). This 
trend will help companies and organizations in the future by decreasing the number of 
different tools required to implement DevOps practises. Unfortunately, this trend does 
not include security related features, so it will be interesting to see when these providers 





Since the target of this study was rather small team (less than 20 employees), it is difficult 
to conclude if the findings of this study would reflect similarly in bigger teams. Big teams 
have multiple engineers from different backgrounds and the variety of expertise could 
help with the selection of participants. In case of this study, only handful of people could 
be considered as possible participant. Hence there was not much variety between 
expertise of the participants. If there would be bigger pool of expertise to select from, 
results of the assessment might have been different. 
The author of this thesis is not an expert on information security, and it was first time that 
the author was conducting information security risk assessment in practice. This might 
affect the results of this study. If the person responsible of conducting risk assessment has 
previous experience about different assessment frameworks, reflecting practicalities of 
GBM-OA and other frameworks could help when conducting risk assessment using 
GBM-OA. 
People who would be participating in the risk assessment were selected in the beginning 
of the assessment process. Unfortunately, not all of the selected people were able to 
participate in the assessment. Hence there was a gap between planned about of expertise 
in the assessment and the actual amount of expertise. If all selected people would have 
been able to participate, results of this study might have changed. 
5.2 Further research 
This study was conducted in one team and the framework was run through once. To verify 
the findings from this study, additional studies should be conducted in different 
companies and in similar context. Also, running the framework through multiple times 
can produce different or new findings. 
When talking about information security risk assessment in general, it is not fun or 
rewarding work for the participants. This was also seen in this study from discussions 
with the participants and from the way they behaved during the assessment. This is a 
problem, especially in qualitative frameworks, since risk assessment is based on 
participants expertise and experiences. Ways of how to motivate participants should be 
studied. In addition, it would be interesting to see how the motivation of participants 
affects the results in qualitative risk assessment frameworks. 
The objective of this study was to find out how well GBM-OA would suit in context of 
centralized CI/CD environment. It would be interesting to see how well the framework 
would suit in the context compared to other qualitative frameworks. If company or 
organization would need to select a qualitative information security risk assessment 
framework in this context, it would be possible that the company or organization would 
select GBM-OA as risk assessment framework even though it would not be suitable if it 
would suit better than other options. 
Findings from this study show that the major reason why GBM-OA is not suitable for the 
context is that the framework does not fit into DevOps practicalities. This finding might 
be different if the team would be using DevSecOps instead of DevOps. A study should 
be conducted in centralized CI/CD environment in DevSecOps way of thinking to see if 
the framework would suit in DevSecOps practicalities. In addition, ways of how to 
integrate GBM-OA into DevSecOps practicalities should be investigated. 
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Appendix A. Notes from risk assessment sessions 
Session 1, PUI Matrix and Genre List 
- Session started after long meeting, so participants were a bit tired. 
- PUI matrix was easy to understand and we did not get stuck while defining 
producers and users. 
- Definition of Genre List raised good discussion from both producer and user point 
of view, which helped us to get insight about details of each genre. 
- Lack of details about the future caused problems while filling Genre List. 
- Four producers and users of information found. 
- 13 different genres found. 
Session 2, Information containers 
- Participants were already aware about what we will be doing during the session, 
so we got started quickly. 
- Value of information containers was questioned. Participants did not understand 
how information containers would help us later with information risk definition. 
- Participants did not understand the details of information containers, so a quick 
recap to introduction session was needed before moving on. 
- First few containers took time before we were able to fill them, but afterwards the 
participants started to understand how the containers work and the definition 
started to move on quickly. 
- Participants were able to define information container for each genre before time 
was up, so quick preview about session 3 was held. 
Session 3, Information asset worksheets 
- Session started later than planned due a long meeting before the session. 
- Information asset worksheet proved hard to understand, so participants got stuck 
at some parts of the worksheet template. 
- Definition of one risk took long time. It is possible that the three sessions were 
held to separately and the participants forgot what was previously defined. 
- Since risks took long time to be defined, given time was not enough to fill the last 
asset worksheet. Last worksheet was filled by participants sending email to 
assessor. 







Appendix B. Interview questions 
1. After the introduction of the assessment framework, what was you feeling of the 
framework? 
2. At the beginning of the assessment framework, what was your feeling about how 
the framework will go through? 
3. After the assessment what was your feeling about the framework? 
4. What do you think about the results? 
5. How well you think the framework suits to the context? 
6. What was the best part of the framework? 
7. What was the worst part of the framework? 
8. What do you think about the templates? 
9. What would you change in the framework? 
10. Were the people selected the right people? 
11. Would you use this framework in another context? 
 
